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To my father, James T. Smith III. Your life was too short, and you didn’t live to see this 
work complete, but everything I do is because of you. Thank you for being my guide. 




 President Donald Trump ascended to the US’s highest hall of power through 
rhetoric that scapegoated marginalized groups, such as Muslims, Hispanics, immigrants, 
foreigners, and others. This work considers the executive order President Donald Trump 
released January 27, 2017, and its revision released March 06, 2017, for how it 
exemplifies Kenneth Burke’s notion of the scapegoat, specifically as outlined in A 
Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives. These executive orders have come to be 
known as the “Muslim Ban” due to the way they implicate Muslims in charges of 
terrorism, harm, and danger and affect the lives and movement of innocent people and 
groups. Since the rhetorical work of these EOs occurs in a veiled, concealed, or silent 
way, the argument is supplemented by Cheryl Glenn’s “rhetoric of silence” as outlined in 
Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence. Framing the EOs in context of Trump’s candidacy and 
first 100 days in office exemplifies how silence augments rhetoric that evokes the  
scapegoat to shape America’s political and social destiny and reveals the machinations of 





 “The Dramatistic screen involves a methodic tracking down of the implications in 
the idea of symbolic action, and of man as the being that is particularly distinguished by 
an aptitude for such action. […] If action is to be our key term, then drama; for drama is 
the culminative form of action […]. But if drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then 
victimage. Dramatism is always on the edge of this vexing problem, that comes to a 
culmination in tragedy, the song of the scapegoat.” 
Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action 54-55 
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CHAPTER 1: The Silenced Scapegoat 
On January 27, 2017 President Donald Trump released an executive order titled 
“Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” that 
implicates Muslims and other groups of charges of aiding, enabling, fostering, and 
participating in terrorism. Hence, it has become known as the “Muslim Ban”. It bans 
travel from seven predominately Muslim countries for 90 days, refugees for 120 days, 
and Syrian refugees indefinitely. Its implementation caused havoc, and, in practice, those 
affected most weren’t the terrorists and criminals it purportedly condemned. Even 
immigrants with official documentation were detained at airports, and innocent 
individuals found their movement restricted and lives disrupted, as many were unable to 
see family and friends, or to pursue their education and career goals in the US. Refugees, 
many of whom had already fled political and violent upheaval in their former nations, 
found the US to be no sanctuary. The EO turned out to be one of many orders Trump 
released during his first 100 days in office, each serving to fulfill his isolationist, 
nationalistic, anti-foreigner, and anti-immigrant campaign promises. As is the case with 
most executive actions, these represented a radical reconstitution of America’s image and 
identity, a vision Trump’s 2016 campaign epitomized: “Make America Great Again”. 
Underlying this positive affirmation of America as something to be great, however, is 
America as something that is not yet great. America is in a state of becoming, and must 
achieve the greatness it once possessed in the past. Electing Trump is the key to attaining 
this pinnacle once again. Ostensibly, the “Muslim Ban” is a step to attain this vision, but 
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it requires sacrifice. America’s speckled history of racial violence, discrimination, and 
segregation means that to attain this vision of America’s past greatness, immigrants, 
foreigners, and non-white others must be purged. Trump courted an electorate majorly 
comprised of white Christians, mobilizing their negative sentiment against marginalized 
groups, such as Muslims, Hispanics, foreigners, immigrants, and etc.. Thus, belying his 
proclamation to make America great is the call to reconfigure America as white and 
Christian, just as it was in the past.  
The “Muslim Ban” sets the conditions by which these groups are to be 
scapegoated and sacrificed. In chapter 2, I will consider more thoroughly how these 
conditions are set in the EO. For now, the important take-away is that scapegoating in 
political rhetoric is imbued with power. Scapegoating is a tool of redirection, channeling 
negative affect at the victimized groups and diverting attention away from the perpetrator 
of scapegoating, and it’s one of many kinds of misdirection used by Trump to ascend into 
the US’s highest hall of power. 
The EO’s purpose is to revise the visa-issuance process, which “plays a crucial 
role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the 
United States.  Perhaps in no instance was that more apparent than the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, when State Department policy prevented consular officers from 
properly scrutinizing the visa applications of several of the 19 foreign nationals who went 
on to murder nearly 3,000 Americans.  And while the visa-issuance process was reviewed 
and amended after the September 11 attacks to better detect would-be terrorists from 
receiving visas, these measures did not stop attacks by foreign nationals who were 
admitted to the United States”. 9/11 exemplifies the danger of not taking measures to 
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tighten the visa process, justifying the EO’s urgency and necessity. Even though the 
countries affected by the EO are yoked to 9/11 and post-9/11 terrorist activities, the EO 
doesn’t include countries “from which radicalized Muslims have actually killed 
Americans in the U.S. since Sept. 11, 2001” (Myre). It also notes that the “deteriorating 
conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the 
likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter the United States”, which 
further justifies changing the “visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for 
admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.” At 
least in the original version of the EO, these “deteriorating conditions” are unclear, 
specified only in general terms. What is clearer is the way these negative attributes as 
varied as “war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest” are linked directly to immigrants having 
“ties to terrorism.” In practice, “ties to terrorism” and “terrorist” is coded as Muslim, 
although its language never goes so far as to name any groups. Rather, the EO uses terms 
and evokes stereotypes, images, concepts, and events loaded with negative sentiment and 
heavily associated with Muslims. At one point, it demands data on information regarding 
“honor killings”. This would be an odd order, if not for its association with Islam. Neither 
does the EO explicitly reveal any preference for Christians, nor bias against Muslims. 
However, it states that it will “prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis 
of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority 
religion in the individual's country of nationality.” In practice, since all seven affected 
countries are predominately Muslim, then Christians are inevitably prioritized. 
Examining the EO allows for me to carefully attend to the components of 
scapegoating, and, thus, follow these traces back to the perpetrator. This will reveal: (a) 
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What the scapegoat intends to misdirect attention and affect away from, and (b) How the 
scapegoat misdirects and deploys power. Particularly, I will consider how silence plays a 
role in political rhetoric that scapegoats. In what follows, I introduce the “Muslim Ban” 
EO and its context while laying the theoretical groundwork of scapegoating and silence 
in US democratic rhetoric. In chapter 2, I examine the “Muslim Ban” more thoroughly in 
context of President Trump’s candidacy and the first 100 days of his administration. 
Lastly, in chapter 3, I will illustrate the sociopolitical and rhetorical implications of 
scapegoating in conjunction with silence by discussing the present and possible future 
ramifications of Trump’s scapegoating on Muslims and other groups. 
I frame my analysis with Kenneth Burke’s notion of the scapegoat, specifically as 
it is described in LaSA and AGoM. However, Burke does not go so far as to discuss the 
role of silence and absence in relation to the scapegoat, and so I will put his work 
alongside Cheryl Glenn’s rhetoric of silence as outlined in Unpsoken. In order to uncover 
how silence and scapegoating have rhetorical effect, I will bring in some discussion of 
symbols and symbol systems based on Burke’s work in LaSA. Political rhetoric is 
possible because of man’s use of symbol systems, such as language, and much of my 
argument hinges upon the fact that silence is capable of being symbolic and imbued with 
the dynamics of power. Thus, it’s an important, if overlooked, part of rhetorical processes 
such as scapegoating. I will borrow from some of James Mcleod’s work on symbol-
making and nation-building in modern US politics, which will illuminate how symbols 
circulate and function within democratic politics and discourse. This will explain the 
dynamics of power involved in Trump’s scapegoating of others, and how scapegoating is 
a form of symbol-making. I will also bring in the work of Danielle Allen in order to 
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understand the racial dynamics involved in modern US democratic symbol-making, 
especially in relation to America’s speckled history with race, and how the “Muslim Ban” 
serves as a continuation of this history. 
My work will address both the scapegoat, a noun, and scapegoating, a verb. The 
distinction between the scapegoat and scapegoating is irrelevant to the argument I make 
here. Burke describes it variously as a symbolic figure capable of being a conduit for 
emotion and affect, and as a process whereby the victim is transformed into the 
scapegoat. This ambiguity may lie in how scapegoating, the process, is inextricably tied 
to the scapegoat, the product. As a verb, scapegoating transforms the apparent image of 
groups and individuals that are scapegoated, but, as a noun, the scapegoat is an image, a 
projection, a sacrificial victim, a chosen vessel, an ideal villain, to use some of Burke’s 
terms. 
From his campaign onward, Trump continuously displays a pattern of mobilizing 
fear, anger, and resentment against less powerful, marginalized groups (Muslims, 
Hispanics, immigrants, foreigners, etc.) while courting a constituency mostly comprised 
of white Christians. Through the EO’s silence regarding Muslims, Trump deploys his 
power by playing off the unspoken ideas and images his audience already holds of the 
enemy, of terrorists and terror, of foreign aliens harming America and its values, of 
“honor killings” and other stereotypes attached to Islam and the Middle East. Silence 
allows him to be indirect, to evade making plain his biases, and to scapegoat in a way 
more sinister, and more powerful, than some of his more obvious, direct quotes suggest. 
He doesn’t need to be explicit. The EO is not officially called the “Muslim ban” or 
“Protecting the Nation From Foreign Muslim Entry into the United States” because it can 
 6 
achieve the same, or greater, effect by more insidious means. In this concealed, veiled, 
and silent way, the EO scapegoats Muslims.  
Scapegoating is a powerful rhetorical tool, and it’s made more powerful, more 
insidious, and more effective when augmented by silence. Scapegoating is alive and well, 
and it draws power not only from explicit language, but also from silence and absence. 
To use a pithy, but relevant, cliché: what is not said can be as meaningful as what is said. 
Or, what is not said is as capable and effective of achieving rhetorical effect as what is 
said.  
According to Burke, the scapegoat is a projection, a substitute, a “chosen vessel, 
[from which the perpetrator] would ritualistically cleanse themselves by loading the 
burden of their own inequities upon it” (AGoM 406). The image of the scapegoat 
embodies the dark reflection of the perpetrator’s undesirable qualities, and the scapegoat 
must be transformed into an enemy to justify its sacrifice, and to allow it to serve as a 
conduit for negative affect, feeling, and sentiment. Burke refers to the “song of 
scapegoat”, the culminative process by which the victimage and sacrifice of the 
scapegoat seems to follow naturally, even necessarily, to bring about some sort of change 
that brings one closer toward perfection, or the ideal. Burke states there “is a kind of 
‘terministic compulsion’ to carry out the implications of one’s terminology” (LaSA 19). 
The “terministic compulsion” is in how perpetrators rely on and construct vocabularies 
and conditions by which the scapegoating process occurs. The scapegoat’s sacrifice is 
made to seem as a natural, inevitable, and necessary final step for purity, following from 
qualities inherent in the scapegoat itself rather than the “scapegoat mechanism” that 
created it in the first place. This conceals the perpetrator, the agent, and brings the 
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scapegoat, the object, into harsh focus. This means the scapegoat is an effective tool for 
perpetrators to distract from their role in the victimization of these groups. By channeling 
their own iniquities into the scapegoat, the perpetrators mask the unfair or unjust systems, 
institutions, and practices from which they benefit. Instead, the focus shifts to the victims 
of this iniquity, obscuring victimage behind the scapegoat’s twisted image. 
Scapegoating is a form of transformation, as it transforms the image of the victim 
into that of the scapegoat. In AGoM, Burke’s defines the “dialectic” as “the possibilities 
of linguistic transformation […] Or […] the study of such possibilities” (406). When 
imposed upon others, the image of the scapegoat distorts the apparent image of the 
groups it covers, twisting them. He defines the three points of dialectic as: “1.) Merger 
and division; 2.) The Three Major Pairs: action-passion, mind-body, being-nothing; 3.) 
Transcendence. Transcendence “may be either a state or a development” (403). The 
scapegoat clearly exemplifies these principles by:   
 “(1) an original state of merger, in that the iniquities are shared by both 
the iniquitous and their chosen vessel; (2) a principle of division, in that the 
elements shared in common are being ritualistically alienated; (3) a new principle 
of merger, this time in the unification of those whose purified identity is defined 
in dialectical opposition to the sacrificial offering” (406). 
When Trump’s campaign slogan calls for America to be made great, it evokes the 
image, or vision, of America as an unfulfilled ideal. America is in a state of development, 
and to be great, it must become a white nation absent of others. This symbolic state 
transcends the brief words of the slogan. This is how the implicit message is understood, 
even if its intentions are not wholly laid bare.  
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By being the “’essence’ of evil” the scapegoat is “the principle of discord felt by 
those [the perpetrators] who are to be purified by the sacrifice” (407). For the scapegoat 
to have cathartic effect (aGoM 406) and to be fulfilled as a scapegoat, there must be 
“drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then victimage” (LaSA 55). If conflict is the discord 
the scapegoat represents, then cleansing oneself of the scapegoat is supposed to bring 
about unification, as the scapegoat is characterized as the only thing standing in the way 
of unification, the discordant element that must be cut. Its victimage is necessary. Burke 
refers to this “unification by a foe shared”. That this foe is fabricated or constructed 
doesn’t matter so long as the scapegoat is successfully framed as the divisive element 
hindering unity. Its cleansing promises unity, but only through the scapegoat’s tragic 
sacrifice.  
Cleansing implies dirtiness, dirt that besmirches that which should be made clean, 
and yet around its corners is the positive image of purity, a state of no dirt. There is an 
antithetical relationship between “dirt” and “purity”, in that one always implies the other 
In Burke’s own terms, the hortatory of “thou shalt not kill” has about its edges the 
positive image of killing, of murder (LaSA 10). The relationship between the negative 
and positive not only limit one another, but also define each other. Similarly, the nature 
of the scapegoat’s dialectical transformation is “reducible purely to the antithetical nature 
of ‘dialectical’ terms, like ‘freedom,’ ‘perfection,’ or the terms for social movements, that 
derive their significance from their relation to opposite terms.” Not only does the 
scapegoat gain significance by its antithetical nature, but it gains power, as well. US 
democratic politics offer many other antithetical relationships that gain power and 
significance by reflecting each other: lawlessness/lawfulness, democrat/republican, 
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terrorist/patriot, American/unAmerican, citizen/foreigner, safety/danger, security/de-
stability, and etc. The positive entail the negative, and vice versa. These antithetical 
relationships not only become evident during the process of scapegoating, but also appear 
and reappear in political rhetoric, including the Trump administration’s. 
The antithesis, as it turns out, is a useful tool, able to justify policy by pointing 
toward the negative. For instance:  
“One may find himself hard put to define a policy purely in its own terms, 
but one can advocate it persuasively by an urgent assurance that it is decidedly 
against such-and-such other policy with which people may be disgruntled. For 
this reason also, the use of antithesis helps deflect embarrassing criticism (as 
when rulers silence domestic controversy by turning public attention to animosity 
against some foreign country’s policies). And in this way, of course, antithesis 
helps reinforce unification by the scapegoat” (LaSA 19). 
The antithetical relationship of lawfulness, lawlessness explains why “criminals 
either actual or imaginary may thus serve as scapegoats in a society that ‘purifies itself’ 
by ‘moral indignation’ in condemning them, though the ritualistic elements operating 
here are not usually recognized by the indignant. When the attacker chooses for himself 
the object of attack, it is usually a blood brother; the debunker is much closer to the 
debunked than others are” (AGoM 406-407). A criminal is a citizen, albeit a lawless, as 
opposed to lawful, citizen. As a blood brother, the scapegoat is chosen for its closeness 
and proximity to the perpetrator, as something must be attached before it can be excised. 
According to Burke’s third point of the dialectical, unification occurs when the 
scapegoat’s identity is cast as antithetical even though the process renders the scapegoat 
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as more of a brother by its reflecting the perpetrator’s flaws, vices, shame, and guilt. 
However, scapegoating rhetoric must maintain the illusion of separated-ness, which is 
usually done by emphasizing geographical, cultural, and political difference, to cast these 
similarities as undesirable. As I will demonstrate further in chapter 2, this is how Trump 
is able to connect immigrants and Muslims with harm, danger, and criminality. 
Burke distinguishes man as a “symbol-using, symbol-making, and symbol-
misusing animal” (LaSa 6). Language, itself, is a symbol system, among many others, 
and words are “a link between us and the nonverbal, words are by the same token a 
screen separating us from the nonverbal—though the statement gets tangled in its own 
traces, since so much of the ‘we’ that is separated from the nonverbal by the verbal would 
not even exist were it not for the verbal (or for our symbolicity in general, since the same 
applies to the symbol systems of dance, painting, music, and the like)” (5). Of note is 
Burke’s recognition that identity, referred to as ‘we’, is symbolically-constructed. Just as 
love necessitates symbolic acts of love to flourish and persist, then so too do nations 
require symbolic acts of nation-building, such as constitutions, laws, official institutions, 
leaders, governments, and etc., to be more than an anarchic mass of disparate group and 
to become a unified identity.  
The scapegoat relies on the defining permeable boundaries between “us” and 
“them”. The construction of in-groups (“us”, “we”, those associated with myself, those 
like myself) and out-groups (“them”, “others”, those not associated with myself, those 
unlike myself) is the root of the scapegoat, although what and whom is included is fluid 
because scapegoating is a form of substitution. The boundaries between us/them are fluid 
because substitution “sets the condition for ‘transcendence,’ since there is a technical 
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sense in which the name for a thing can be said to ‘transcend’ the thing named” (LaSA 8), 
and so the scapegoat transcends the groups it victimizes, allowing for the scapegoat to 
encompass a diverse array of out-groups. 
Symbols have the power to affect the world, to build nations, to move bodies, 
sometimes forcibly, as is so in the case of the draft, eviction, exile, or incarceration, and 
sometimes in other ways, such as when a body is inspired or influenced to go to war or to 
the voting booth. We don’t only make and use symbols, but misuse symbols, suggesting 
that the terministic screens by which we filter reality don’t perfectly, or even necessarily, 
coincide with reality. As the symbol-using animal, we “tinker with various kinds of 
substitution as we encounter in men’s modes of penance, expiation, compensation, 
paying of fines in lieu of bodily punishment, and the cult of the scapegoat” (LaSA 8). 
This is true even for the “Muslim Ban” that charges groups of terrorism, as exemplified 
by 9/11, without these countries actually being involved in terrorist attacks during and 
since 9/11. Instead, the justification lies in the possibility that these groups may be 
terrorists, setting one of the conditions by which the EO scapegoats Muslims. 
The scapegoat flourishes in the US political system because it is inherently 
divisive, ritualistic, and imbued with a symbol system that allows for in-groups and out-
groups to be starkly defined along partisan, racial, ethnic, national, gendered, and 
sociopolitical lines. Political rhetoric must include the “in-group symbolically and 
exclude the out-group symbolically, and they provide political justification for elite 
behavior (Simmel 1955)” (Mcleod 5). In a discussion of Kenneth Burke’s notion of the 
consubstantiation that occurs when individuals align and identify with one another, 
Cheryl Glenn states that “every bit as important to Burke’s notions of coming together, of 
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cohering, is the psychic and emotional importance of leaving some one, or some coherent 
group, out: the scapegoat. Nothing brings people together, helps them identify, makes 
them consubstantial faster than a common enemy…” (Unspoken 50). 
In the context of politics, deciding who is “in” and who is “out” is part of the 
shared project of symbolic nation building. A nation, or at least its ideal, is constructed 
from symbols. Political rhetoric draws from a pool of myths and symbols to construct the 
nation in a symbolic form, and this symbolic form shapes the creation of in-groups and 
out-groups, which influences the form the scapegoat takes. Rituals, including the ritual of 
the scapegoat, are how citizens are initiated into “the symbol world, ideals, and political 
structure of their community”, making symbols fundamental to democracy (Allen 27). 
They are ever-present in democratic discourse, as “the creation of political mythology is 
the business of the political rhetorician” (McLeod 364). In the US democratic system, 
symbols tend to be bipartisan, encouraging loyalty and devotion to the Party. Just as 
“’hope,’ ‘change,’ and ‘the economy’ all became elements of the Clinton political myth” 
(McLeod 363), so too did they become elements of democrat Barack Obama’s rhetoric 
and political myth. In the same way, Trump inherits Republican symbols and mythology 
that set the conditions of scapegoating and the shape and form the scapegoat assumes. 
Democracy is a “world of strangers, where large-scale events are supposed to 
arise out of one’s own consent and yet never really do” (Tts 27). Therefore, symbols, and 
the act of symbol-making, negotiate the immense divide between citizens and public 
policy. After all, “…it is much easier to fashion […] symbols of the state we desire than 
that state itself. If democratic citizens rule themselves, they do so fully, in reality, only in 
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their symbol worlds. The manipulation of ideal symbols, however, gives a democratic 
citizen psychological access to political power” (22).  
Symbolic nation-building is plainest during US national presidential elections, 
when it is “used to construct competitive rhetorical sociodramas between the candidates. 
This makes the process of electing the president a national ritual of integration and 
revitalization” (McLeod 370). The election which acts “as a means for the introduction of 
new values and symbolic elements in American civil religion (Bellah 1974; Bennett 
1980; McLeod l991a). Values are rearranged, reexamined, redeveloped, and reintegrated 
into a new synthesis (Herzog 1987). Presidential rhetoric provides the symbolic means 
through which these values are tested, examined, and claimed by the electorate (Bailey 
1981). From this perspective, presidential elections are the modern political rituals that 
provide the mythical charters for the expression of economic and social relationships” 
(Mcleod 4). The ritual of scapegoating parallels the political rituals already in place in the 
US. Like the integration and revitalization of the election, Burke’s third point of the 
dialectic is also a reconfiguration, albeit specifically in opposition to the scapegoat. 
Defining what an American is, requires we consider what an American is not, and what is 
not is vulnerable to scapegoating. 
Imagine the spaces and images tied to democratic symbol-making and -using. A 
common image, ubiquitous during elections, is the political arena in the form of a solitary 
rhetor on a stage, delivering speeches to the public on issues of policy. It is a stage mostly 
absent of others where the powerful political figure more often than not exemplifies 
Washington’s white majority. On a stage like this, Bush drummed up support for a war in 
Iraq by mobilizing post-9/11 America’s fear of an insidious other, and Iraq and Islam 
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were referred to in terms of the “war on terror” despite tenuous evidence justifying the 
invasion. On a similar stage Donald Trump resurrected a phantom from Ronald Raegan’s 
1980 campaign: the slogan “Make America Great Again.” He tapped into conservative 
consciousness to invoke fear of a silent Other, of the “them” that doesn’t share our 
(Christian, American) values, by projecting the decline of the white working class onto 
foreign and alien others, often in hyperbolic but nonspecific terms. The other is absent 
and appears silent as a white rich man extols to a largely white voter base the virtues of 
building a wall between the US and Mexico to keep “them”—the others, the immigrants, 
the illegal criminal aliens, and etc.—out. 
Images of pontificating and speech-giving politicians make symbolic nation-
building seem noisy, but accompanying the noise is silence. Silence is ever-present, and 
exists even amidst noise. It punctuates every conversation as the lulls and spaces between 
words, and that “because one cannot say everything, speech consists above all in 
silences.” (7). Speech and silence are rarely separate as “[speech] and silence depend 
upon each other; behind all speech is silence, and silence surrounds all speech” 
(Unspoken 7). In Unspoken, Cheryl Glenn, first and foremost, considers silence as a 
rhetoric, “as a constellation of symbolic strategies that (like spoken language) serves 
many functions.” She categorizes silence as “an absence with a function, and a rhetorical 
one at that” (4). Similar to my description of democratic symbol-making as noisy, Glenn 
also characterizes Western rhetorical tradition as noise-focused, concentrating on the 
verbal to the detriment of the nonverbal. Glenn claims that “language has long 
represented the specifically human way of transcending biology and achieving humanity, 
culture” (Glenn 3), and that Western rhetorical tradition has long emphasized the verbal, 
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highlighting the nonverbal only in relation to spoken and written word. This means 
silence is rarely explicitly recognized. Glenn uncovers, or “opens”, the silence that is so 
often concealed, overlooked, or ignored, using an “interpretive framework that shapes 
language and silence as reciprocal rather than as opposites” to figure “silence as a 
rhetoric” (155). Although not all silence is equally or even at all significant, significant 
silence, or what is left unspoken, is overlooked because it simply isn’t being listened to 
and understood. Silence is not emptiness and is imbued with meaning that requires 
attention. 
Silence, in and of itself, may be imbued with meaning: gendered, racialized, 
imbued with power, and tied to power dynamics. Oppression and subjugation may appear 
as silence, although it’s not always recognized as such. Depending on the situation, 
silence can deploy or defer to power (15), which means it can be variously wielded, 
enforced, imposed, or assumed by choice. It also determines how silence is interpreted, as 
“like speech, the meaning of silence depends on a power differential that exists in every 
rhetorical situation: who can speak, who must remain silent, who listens, and what those 
listeners do” (9). The question of “what those listeners do” explains why silence is often 
mischaracterized or ignored, as silence is often misinterpreted or ignored by dominant 
groups. Power changes the nature of silence, determining the form it takes as either 
silence or silencing. The difference is in the former being an assumed stance, and the 
latter being an imposition. 
Silence, absence, and omission are often the conditions for the scapegoat’s birth 
and sacrifice. The scapegoat must be silenced, or at least appear silent, for the scapegoat 
to be made into a suitable screen upon which the perpetrator can project their own 
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iniquities. Comorbid with silence is absence, as silence is a form of absence. The absent, 
silent scapegoat creates a space for the projection of negative emotions, sentiments, and 
affects. It belies the systems already in place: the politics of speaking out and silence, of 
the spoken and unspoken, the political and cultural institutions that determine who is the 
perfect scapegoat. Silence figures heavily in Glenn’s case study of the scapegoating of 
Lani Guinier by Bill Clinton and the US media. On April 29, 1993, Clinton nominated 
Guinier “to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, as assistant Attorney 
General under Janet Reno” (64). However, public opinion turned against Guinier turned 
when the media willfully misinterpreted her scholarship on voting rights and race as un-
American and un-democratic. Guinier “had to remain silent and […] no one was asking 
her questions; no one was listening to her. The White House was saying very little, 
thereby exerting its masculinist power through silence. Resisting her professional training 
as a speaker, writer, and arguer, Lani Guinier was saying nothing, thereby inhabiting a 
traditionally feminine im/position of silence. Clinton, on the other and, used his silence to 
deliver his power” (69). 
The public and media filtered Guinier’s silence through several layers of 
assumptions and preconceptions regarding race and gender to distort her image into the 
scapegoat, and so “the bigger her silenced image became, ‘the more I served as a blank 
screen for projected threats, insecurities, and frustrations’” (66). Guinier’s image was a 
form of absence; an absence of her credibility, education, accomplishments, and the high 
recommendation she had previously received for the position. Her image was a 
“fabrication” (66). She wasn’t truly a threat to America. She was an advocate for equal 
voting rights. She wrote “thoughtfully engaging civil rights legislation with voting 
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practices”, and she “discovered how easily a nonwhite—or white—candidate could be 
elected by a majority (even by a majority of a minority population) without ever being 
responsive to the needs of that minority population. But by the time this footnote (or an 
interpretation thereof) from her scholarly writing gained circulation in the popular press, 
it had morphed into a New York Times editorial newsbite: Guinier ‘questions whether 
[Douglass Wilder of Virginia] is an ‘authentic’ figure for blacks—because he owes his 
job to white voters as well.’ (qtd. in Gigot). This interpretation of her opinions did not 
reflect what she had ever said, let alone written.” (66). The racial tribalism is clear in how 
the media scapegoated Guinier, twisting her call for equality into a false image. To 
prevent the disruption her policies represented in an unequal system from which whites 
benefit, Guinier had to be silenced and scapegoated. The media twisted her cries for 
equality into racial tribalism, reflecting the systemic inequality that separated races. 
Guinier’s image had nothing to do with Guinier, but it did have everything to do with 
those who silenced her, and the kind of enemy and sacrificial victim they desired to hide 
their blame and quell their guilt. 
Not only is the scapegoat imposed on marginalized others, but it also reaffirms the 
status of marginalization. It not only flattens the image of the marginalized through 
“common sense” stereotypes and generalizations, but also silences these groups. The 
scapegoat rarely speaks, as the scapegoat is but a distorted image. Especially in 
democratic politics, where “to speak” is thought to be a symbol of power and authority, 
the scapegoat’s silencing is disempowerment. Marginalized groups always inhabit silence 
by virtue of existing on the edges of mainstream political rhetoric, and oppression often 
appears as silence. The politics of silence and silencing empower the scapegoat by 
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hampering marginalized groups’ ability to speak out or to be heard. Glenn’s 
consideration of the relationships between silence and Native groups in the US is an 
example of how the imposition of flat images distort and silence marginalized groups: 
“The [image of the] Real Indian is the ‘white man’s Indian’—a deliberate 
fabrication of the unreal that paradoxically satisfies the American imagination’s 
demand for the real […] The white conception of The Indian (a pan-Indian 
identity that flattened out the thousands of distinct native societies) has evolved 
throughout the centuries, to be sure, but always in concert with white psychic 
needs (dominance, curiousity, contempt, greed).  
[…] 
[The] hyperreal simulations of the Real Indian have long supplanted any 
actual person or tribal remembrance, for they define the Indians in terms of what 
they are not, namely white European Americans. As an authentic fabrication, 
then, the Real Indian memorializes rather than perpetuates any tribal presence” 
(108-109). 
The Real Indian covers the real experiences of Native people, hampering them 
from articulating their experience in anything but terms that reaffirm its imposed image. 
Even when these experiences are articulated, dominant groups may still choose not to 
listen. However, although silenced, Native people also inhabit silence as a choice. Just as 
there are various ways for silence to deploy power, so, too, are there various ways to 
inhabit silence. Although it may seem to defer to power, this image of deference may 
conceal dissent and rebellion. Further, a silenced individual can, at the same time, choose 
to inhabit silence as an assumed stance. The delineation between being silent and silenced 
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is rarely clear. It’s important to recognize these contrary and different experiences. If 
silencing requires “covering over” real bodies with the singular image of the scapegoat, 
then breaking this image requires recognizing and attending to this difference by realizing 
that “many individuals can tell recognizable or wildly divergent versions of the same 
stories, the same truth. It all depends on the individual” (147). Glenn’s interviews with 
Native people on their experiences with silence, reveals this ambiguity, uncovering 
various, often conflicting, experiences with silence. Many of the interviewees describe 
silence as a cultural practice, such as when one man says that Navajos are “taught to 
listen and watch what’s around us”(119), the silence involved in courtship and mourning 
(125;134); another interviewee calls it a form of “meditation” (119); for some it’s a 
personal habit (120). Others point toward silence as a misunderstanding that occurs when 
Indians enter white spaces, moving from their home culture and “going into a completely 
different culture. A lot of it has to do, too, with Indian people, especially in the 
Southwest, when they speak their languages it’s difficult to make that transition from 
their own tribal language as opposed to English” (121). Silence may also be a form of 
protection, “self-protection, nourishment, and respect” (145). Glenn states that “Not 
surprisingly, I did not receive many responses specific to curing ceremonies—nor should 
I. After all, as Laguna-affiliated Paula Gunn Allen reminds us, Native people, 
‘particularly Pueblos,’ are ‘protective toward their traditions’ (“Problems” 56)” (137). 
Danielle Allen’s Talking to Strangers further evidences the complexities of 
silence and silencing, specifically in regard to the sociopolitical realities of the US. Allen 
opens with the example of Elizabeth Eckford, one of the few black students chosen to 
attend the white Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, when it was first 
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desegregated in 1957. When Eckford finds herself under assault in a public space for 
exercising her legal and political rights, Allen describes her suffering as “intense, 
contained, and quiet” (3). Her silence contrasts with the intensity of the raucous, 
belligerent white mob, creating a stark image of America’s unequal forms of citizenship. 
Eckford’s silence was both enforced and assumed. As a marginalized citizen, Eckford 
inhabited silence, knowing her words would not be listened to, misinterpreted, or ignored. 
She did not have the privilege to speak. However, the silence also served as protection, a 
buffer between herself and the mob. Further, Allen suggests that her silent walk into the 
school belies a black culture of sacrifice where parents like Eckford’s sent their children 
to school knowing the hatred they’d face, but encountering that form of hatred serves as a 
right-of-passage in an America that subordinates blackness. Eckford’s silence, then, can 
be read as recognition of what she faces. However, this is not to suggest that Eckford’s 
silence was only about acquiescence or obedience. Too often the silence of marginalized 
groups is “read as simple passivity in situations where it has actually taken on an 
expressive power and has, in fact, transformed the rhetorical situation itself” (Glenn 155). 
Her silence can be seen as a form of protest. The photo of Eckford’s silent walk 
circulated widely in the press of the day, inciting the nation’s sympathy in her favor, and 
made the white mob look uncivilized by comparison. It rendered the ugliness of 
segregation so overtly that it could no longer be ignored or concealed.  
Neither the example of Glenn’s Native interviewees nor Allen’s description of 
Eckford contain outright scapegoating, but they do exemplify the conditions that allow 
for the scapegoat to manifest. After all, the scapegoat must be silent or, at least, its image 
must appear silent for it to serve as a suitable screen for projection. The scapegoat may 
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appear silent when it is truly silenced, the silenced scapegoat. The US political system, as 
tribal and divisive as it is, magnifies the scapegoat’s image, allowing for its perpetrators 
to gain power and authority from the ostracization, severance, and destruction of 
marginalized people. In the following chapter, I will consider how Trump’s presidential 
candidacy and first 100 days in office was made possible by his evoking the scapegoat, 
exploiting marginalized groups by inciting unjust sentiment against them. In particular, I 
will look at the scapegoating of Muslims, specifically in context of the “Muslim Ban” 
EO. However, due to the permeable boundaries of the scapegoat, I will also need to focus 
on how other marginalized groups become scapegoats.  Trump constructs a scapegoat in 
terms of terrorism, criminality, danger, and what is not American. But, the scapegoat is 
so much more than just the antithesis of American-ness, safety, and unity. It reflects that 
which must be purged, the “dirt” of bigotry and racial division in the US. The political 
scapegoat embodies the US’s speckled history of inequality, oppression, and 
marginalization, sacrificed in an attempt to prevent changing the status quo of dominant 
groups hold on power. It must be carefully disentangled to reveal the dark reflection of 





CHAPTER 2: The “Muslim Ban” 
Isolationism, jingoist patriotism, resentment, and fear of the “other” precede the 
“Muslim Ban’s” conception. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign set the conditions and 
vocabulary by which scapegoating occurs and starkly delineated the in-groups and out-
groups involved. He evokes the scapegoat on political stages and in areas where the 
voices of the marginalized are notably absent, or silent, and the dominant voices of 
predominately white, wealthy politicians are magnified. He built his platform on the basis 
of anti-Muslim and anti-Other sentiment, and his campaign centered around the slogan to 
“Make America Great Again” aimed at evangelical Christians and the white working 
class fearful and resentful of their perceived abandonment by the government and a 
changing U.S. culture that no longer seemed to serve their interests.  
Relying heavily on Republican political mythology steeped in Christian and 
conservative appeals inherited from Ronald Raegan, George W. Bush, and others, Trump 
spoke on the level of distrust, fear, and wariness of “others”. He established “the 
American people” as an in-group, and although he rarely states whom this group consists 
of, but as he used it during his campaign it stands for white Christians with concerns 
about their job prospects and financial security. In opposition are the scapegoats of 
globalism in the form of American manufacturing jobs overseas being sent overseas to 
China, the fear of terror and terrorism, and anxieties regarding the perceived 
marginalization of Christian values. He freely promised to build a wall on the US-
Mexican border to keep out undocumented immigrants, or illegal aliens, blamed for 
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various societal ills, including occupying the jobs that would otherwise go to 
underemployed American citizens. He also promised to return industry and 
manufacturing to America, encouraging companies to “buy American and hire 
American,” evoking America as an ideal. 
Trump’s identification with the in-group, the “American people”, is evident in his 
speech at the National Prayer Breakfast shortly after his inauguration. He brushes off the 
obvious socioeconomic differences between himself and his voter base, stating “so easily 
we forget this, that the quality of our lives is not defined by our material success, but by 
our spiritual success” (Beckwith). Trump becomes one of “the American people” by 
spirituality defined as belief in the Christian God.  He professes to being “blessed to be 
raised in a churched home” (Beckwith). Of course, Trump doesn’t outright profess to be 
Christian, although he makes moves to align himself with the religious. He does this 
despite the silent corollary that he’s blessed to be rich and blessed to profit from 
gambling and entertainment industries that are arguably opposite of Christian values. 
However, any difference goes unspoken, recognized only briefly in his admission that 
he’s “somebody that has had material success and knows tremendous numbers of people 
with great material success,” but then says, “Many of those people [with material 
success] are very, very miserable, unhappy people” (Beckwith). Trump subordinates 
himself as an agent in his rhetoric to minimize the distance between himself as a rich, 
pampered man and his audience. He is a “somebody,” not an I, and collapses his agency 
into the pronouns “we” and “our,” which imply his inclusion, rather than exclusion, from 
the audience. He describes that the “The people in this room come from many, many 
backgrounds. You represent so many religions and so many views. But we are all united 
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by our faith, in our creator and our firm knowledge that we are all equal in His eyes. We 
are not just flesh and bone and blood, we are human beings with souls.” Although the 
people come from “many, many backgrounds,” their diversity is specific, as it’s not a 
diversity of religious belief, but diversity within the narrow category of Christian faith. 
(Beckwith). This diversity covers over the difference of the marginalized while exalting 
the dominant, Christian group. Trump goes on to connect this in-group’s faith to the 
government, saying “our republic was formed on the basis that freedom is not a gift from 
government, but that freedom is a gift from God.” As part of symbolic nation-building, 
he constructs an America that is Christian, that is great and exceptional, and is white. A 
vision of the ideal America is not complete without the ideal American. Couched in 
rhetoric about ideal America are clues as to who is, and who is not, an American 
(criminal illegal aliens, non-whites, non-hetero-normative, non-Christian, illegal 
immigrants, immigrants, refugees, etc.) and who is out. 
Trump emphasized the need to “Make America Great Again”, meaning that, if 
America hadn’t been great in the past, then it will become great again., and Trump would 
be the catalyst to that greatness. His rhetoric evokes “America”, albeit a uniform, non-
immigrant, white, Christian America. His invocation of America as great is 
interchangeable with America as perfect, and this positive, affirmative vision of America 
requires a scapegoat, a negative, disruptive other, a symbol able to channel negative 
sentiment, affect, and emotion. Burke’s “principle of perfection” reveals itself “most 
perfectly in our tendency to conceive of a ‘perfect enemy’ (LaSA 18). Then, this perfect 
enemy must be charged with negativity and be ritually cut away to purify the country. 
Around the edges of the slogan to make America great again is the negative, antithetical 
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image of an America that is not great in the present.  America must be made perfect, and 
implicit in “making America great” is the hortatory “vote for Trump”. In this way, Trump 
set the conditions for scapegoating, albeit a form that benefits him.  
Of course, in creating an out-group, Trump must align himself with his electorate, 
creating an in-group, and maintain the boundary between the in-group and the 
scapegoated out-group. Recently inaugurated, Trump’s “Muslim Ban” EO—one of many 
he released in quick succession—had to fulfill his anti-“other” promise with 
demonstrable action while also transforming his rhetoric into something more palpable, 
or at least not so overtly obvious in its intent that it could be outright contested. Further, it 
worked to normalize bigoted sentiment, justifying Muslims status as a scapegoated 
group. Scapegoating tends to refer back to itself, as the process of scapegoating begets an 
implicit and explicit vocabulary and string of associations by which groups are yoked to 
the dirt that must be cleansed. Much of the rhetorical work of scapegoating Muslims and 
others precede the “Muslim Ban”. EO is but a culmination of this work, taking advantage 
of years of conservative rhetoric that already set the conditions for the scapegoating. 
Trump calls this the song of the scapegoat. 
The countries affected by the “Muslim Ban” are not named in the language of the 
EO. Rather, the list is available on a separate fact sheet. The seven countries affected are 
identical to former President Obama’s restrictions to the visa waiver program, and are 
“countries that were designated by Congress and the Obama Administration as posing 
national security risks” (Fact Sheet). The Fact Sheet goes on to state that the “United 
States has the world’s most generous immigration system, yet it has been repeatedly 
exploited by terrorists and other malicious actors who seek to do us harm.” Most 
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generous is contestable, but, more important is the explicit way that these groups, through 
implications of terrorism, are linked to “harm” or “danger.” This is made clearer by Rudy 
Giuliani, Trump’s former campaign surrogate. On Fox News, Jeanine Pirro, a former 
judge, asks Giuliani’s opinion on Judge Ann Donnelly issuing a temporary restraining 
order on the deportation of a few hundred people affected by the “Muslim Ban” EO. 
Giuliani replies, “I think it’s absolutely a terrific explanation of what’s been wrong with 
this country for 20, 30 years…I couldn’t get the immigration services to deport the 
criminals that were coming out of jail…It’s totally absurd. What Donald Trump wants to 
do…focus on criminal illegal aliens and get them out of the United States. Who possibly 
could object to that?” 
Pirro emphatically agrees, adding that in “the executive action that Trump just 
signed, he talked about limiting visas from those countries that refused to accept 
criminals back to these countries. These countries that say, ‘Oh no. He’s too dangerous 
for us to take back.’  Well here’s the deal now we’re gonna pull you by the short-hairs. 
You can’t come here.” 
Below is my transcription of another part of the exchange where Giuliani 
explicitly admits the intent of and motivation for the ban: 
“Pirro: I want to ask you about this ban. I want to ask you about this ban 
and the protest. Does the ban have anything to do with religion? How did the 
president decide the seven countries? […] 
Giuliani: I’ll tell you the whole history of it. When he first announced it, 
he said ‘Muslim Ban’. He called me up and said, ‘Put a commission together. 
Show me the right way to do it legally.’ I put a commission together […] a whole 
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group of very expert lawyers on this, and what we did, what we focused on, 
instead of religion, was danger. Areas of the world that create danger for us, 
which is a factual basis, not a religious basis. Perfectly legal, perfectly sensible, 
and that’s what the ban is based on.” 
Pirro easily links those affected by the EO to criminality without explicitly stating 
how and why she makes such a connection, as if the link is self-evident. At best the link 
is tenuous, save for how EO reaffirms the conditions by which these groups can be 
scapegoated, removing the rhetorical work for Pirro and Giuliani. From the start, the 
relationship that the “Muslim Ban” recognizes most explicitly is immigrants’ link to 
lawlessness and danger, and so it’s no accident that Giuliani, Pirro, Trump, and their ilk, 
evoke criminality. Criminality is behavior that is not lawful within a society, defined by 
the negative, which helps to “radically define the elements to be victimized” (LaSA 18). 
In the case of the EO, the negative (terrorists, danger, immigrants, lawlessness, 
unAmerican), serves as justification for its existence. Without these negatives, it wouldn’t 
have anything to oppose, and wouldn’t be able to exist. The positive vision of America 
(freedom, justice, safety, lawfulness, whiteness, Christian majority, security) exists only 
in contrast to what America is not (terrorism, danger, harm, criminals, lawlessness, non-
Christian, non-white). Danger becomes immediate, urgent, and powerful when it’s 
attached to an aggressor, a source, making it an effective substitution. Since scapegoating 
is a form of substitution, and substitution “sets the condition for ‘transcendence,’” (LaSA 
8), the EO is able to substitute Muslim (Trump’s initial “Muslim Ban”) for danger. 
Danger is substituted for terrorist, which is substituted, again, for Muslim (albeit in a 
concealed, insidious, indirect, and silent way; Muslim is coded). The terms, such as 
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danger, terrorist, criminal, etc., used to channel iniquity on the scapegoat transcend any of 
the diverse groups it victimizes. Muslims, refugees, legal and illegal immigrants, and etc. 
all appear as one. The scapegoat covers them in the image of the “perfect villain” that is 
justified, and necessary, to sacrifice.  
The revised version of the EO, released March 06 2017 in response to SCOTUS 
allowing for parts of it to remain intact, makes exceptions for certain “bona fide” ties and 
relationships to the US, such as close family members (but not extended family), 
education, employment offers, and etc.. The revision makes explicit relationships and ties 
to the US that always existed, of which the initial EO did not, by accident or design, 
recognize. However, even though the revised EO recognizes these relationships, still 
gains its power by the fabricated narrative that crystalizes the relationship between the 
scapegoat, criminality, danger, harm, and terrorism. 
To paraphrase Giuliani, a terrorist ban is, or at least appears, perfectly legal, 
perfectly sensible. For example, the initial draft of EO evokes “common sense” Muslim 
stereotypes that are explicitly characterized at odds with what is American (the 
constitution, America’s founding principles, etc.), although it still performs the trick of 
not explicitly naming Muslims because its language is coded as Muslim. Though the 
explicit name is absent, this absence is still clearly understood as symbolic: 
 “In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those 
admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding 
principles.  The United States cannot, and should not, admit those who do not 
support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over 
American law.  In addition, the United States should not admit those who engage 
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in acts of bigotry or hatred (including "honor" killings, other forms of violence 
against women, or the persecution of those who practice religions different from 
their own) or those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual 
orientation.” 
[…] 
Sec. 10.  Transparency and Data Collection.  (a)  To be more transparent 
with the American people, and to more effectively implement policies and 
practices that serve the national interest, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, shall, consistent with applicable law and 
national security, collect and make publicly available within 180 days, and every 
180 days thereafter: 
[…] 
“(iii) information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based 
violence against women, including honor killings, in the United States by foreign 
nationals, since the date of this order or the last reporting period, whichever is 
later; […]” (Exec. Ord. 13769; emphasis added). 
The revised version omits some (but not all) of the more overt mentions of 
religion (a notable absence and silence), a move that buries, but does not negate, the 
prejudice underlying the EO. It is worth noting that at each stage— from its alleged 
conception as a “Muslim Ban”, to the initial version of EO 13769, to the revised version 
of EO 13780—the scapegoating is made less apparent, concealed and couched in 
language that appears more acceptable and less overtly prejudiced while, in practice, still 
retaining prejudice. This is most evident in some of the holdover language in the revision. 
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EO 13780 still contains section 10, subsection iii requiring the reporting of “acts of 
gender-based violence against women, including honor killings, in the United States by 
foreign nationals”. Are “honor killings” so common, so remarkable, so much of a 
pressing issue in the US that the government must categorically classify the offender 
based on religion in every way but name? Have marginalized groups not spoken out 
about hate crimes based on gender, race, and sexual orientation, discrimination, sexual 
assault, police brutality, and the socio-economic consequences of systemic inequity and 
prejudice? Yet, these are neatly ignored, silenced, and covered over. The charge of 
“honor killings” is “common sense” and “sensible” only in the sense that the conditions 
for scapegoating Muslims already been set in place by yoking them to danger, difference, 
and harm. It is “common sense” in the pool of conservative rhetoric that Trump 
generously draws from. As Cheryl Glenn says, “one party [the marginalized party] 
simply cannot voice his or her complaints or point because the other party insists on 
speaking within a different language game or genre of discourse” (Unspoken 6). Trump, 
and the US, has a traumatic history concerning racism, sexism, and bigotry. Mobilizing 
bigotry and negative sentiment worked to get Trump into office, but, as I stated before, 
Trump’s rhetoric as a candidate had to superficially transform to be not outright 
contestable. Whenever overt bigotry won’t due, bigotry coded in legal terms will. That 
this bigotry is projected onto the scapegoat is a consequence of the cleansing process. 
Trump’s voice seems the loudest of all, his power magnifying his speech and 
silence to the detriment of others. His face, his family, his words crowded traditional and 
social media and is the focus of public discourse to the point that everything not Trump 
appears silent, at least according to a media focused on the bombast and sensationalism 
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of presidential politics. Trump’s rhetoric, his scapegoating of others, his very presence, 
silences marginalized groups. But, as it turns out, this silence conceals roaring dissent. 
Following Trump’s election—and in light of his sexist sentiments, actions, and words— 
protestors gathered for the women’s march on Washington, bringing dissent and noise 
into a political space that is too often silent or evasive on such issues. The march 
represented an intrusion into a space of power where the marginalized are too often 
silent. Part of “speaking out” often requires a reversal of power when the silenced speak 
in spaces where their voices are an intrusion. As I described in chapter 1, Eckford’s silent 
walk contrasts with the raucous mob, revealing the dynamics of power, of silence and 
silencing, in the US. The voices of the women at the march reveal the nature of silencing: 
what once appears silent reveals itself as not being silent at all, forcing the media and 
public to notice the shift. 
As outlined in the first chapter, the boundaries of the scapegoat are permeable. 
Hence, it’s difficult to discuss Trump’s scapegoating of Muslims without recognizing the 
ways other groups are scapegoated and silenced. Even when the distinction is made 
between “immigrants” and “illegal immigrants”, the line is still blurry, especially since 
“illegal immigrant” or “alien immigrant” is a racialized category associated heavily with 
Hispanic and Mexican immigrants, and so all groups even loosely associated suffer 
because of conventions and conditions set up by conservative political rhetoric. Hispanic 
individuals—immigrant or not, legal or not—find themselves victimized by the specter of 
the scapegoat, their difference erased behind the scapegoat’s image. The “Muslim Ban” 
blurs this further, as it even affects those going through the official, legal immigration 
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process. The message is clear: even legal immigration is illegal. All immigration is 
dangerous to America.  
On a separate occasion, when discussing the creation of a special office “to serve 
American victims” of the crimes of illegal immigrants, Trump says it will provide “a 
voice to those who have been ignored by our media, and silenced by special interests” 
(Kopan).  The office is called Victims Of Immigration Crime Engagement, or VOICE, 
created as a consequence of the executive order released January 25th, 2017 (EO 13768). 
On July 28th, 2017, Trump hosted the families of victims of crimes perpetuated by illegal 
immigrants. Directly addressing the families, he states, “You lost the people that you love 
because our government refused to enforce our nation’s immigration laws and that’s 
including the existing immigration laws. For years the pundits, journalists, politicians in 
Washington refused to hear your voices, but on Election Day 2016 your voices were 
heard all across the entire world. No one died in vain, I can tell you that” (Kopan). 
If the scapegoat is, indeed, a “blood brother”, then Trump’s emphasis on silence, 
silencing, voice, and speaking out aligns Trump’s voter base (native-born Americans, 
white Americans, &etc.) with marginalized “blood brothers” (immigrants, etc.). This is a 
form of silencing, co-opting these groups’ experiences of inhabiting silence and being 
silenced, rendering them to silence once again. The possibility of crimes perpetuated 
against immigrants (illegal or otherwise) isn’t even brought up and, if it is, would be 
explained away as another example of how the media silences white Americans, 
protecting the status quo from the disruptive voices of the marginalized. At least 
symbolically, this positions dominant groups in the place of the oppressed, the 
antithetical relationship reversed. Of course, this isn’t to say that the power dynamic 
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between the dominant and marginalized groups truly changes. The marginalized are still 
marginalized; the dominant still dominate. As stated earlier, the reversal ultimately serves 
a different purpose. Rather than disrupting the status quo, it maintains the power of 
dominant groups. Here, other antithetical relationships become clear: 
disruption/maintenance and marginalization/dominance. 
Relevant to these questions is a quote taken from a CNN news report regarding 
Trump’s focus on criminal illegal aliens, demonstrating the power of the scapegoat as a 
fabrication: 
“Advocates of Trump's approach say that the actual rate of crime among 
immigrants is irrelevant. 
‘The point is that every crime that is committed by someone who is here 
illegally is a crime that would not occur if they weren't in the country,’ said Hans 
von Spakovsky, a legal expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation, which has 
been influential in advising the Trump administration. 
Von Spakovsky said the provisions are merited for the sake of data.  
‘I think that's a very important piece of transparency,’ von Spakovsky 
said. ‘That is something that those in favor of illegal immigration have long tried 
to ignore and cover up. They don't want the public to know about the Kate 
Steinles of the world who have been killed by illegal aliens, who were released by 
sanctuary cities instead of being given to the feds to deport’” (Kopan). 
By now, the reversal is obvious. The maintenance of existing power dynamics is 
concealed as an act of “speaking out” from silence when truly it allows the same 
individuals to keep speaking in a register only they have access to. The language reflects 
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the scapegoating process that now should be familiar. The charge that “they don’t want 
the public to know about the Kate Steinles of the world” establishes an out-group as 
“they”. Although the exact shape that “they” assumes is unclear, it serves as a symbolic 
(albeit, perhaps, constructed) oppressor to make the dominant appear oppressed, and the 
oppressed appear as “perfect villains”, or alternatively, “perfect victims”, deserving of 
hatred, justified by the capitalization of tragedy (“this murder, any murder at all like it, 




CHAPTER 3: The Eerie Mirror 
According to Burke, the scapegoat is culmination, a song that builds up over time 
until it reaches its final note in the form of cleansing (LaSA 54-55). As the “Muslim Ban” 
suggests, scapegoating conceals the victimage of those it victimizes, but the process is 
not always overt or explicit. Often, scapegoating is coded in indirection and silence, 
relying on preconditions that ultimately define the form the scapegoat will take. Burke 
calls the scapegoat “the concentration of power, hence [it] may possess the ambiguities of 
power, which may be for either good or evil” (aGoM 407). Discussion of the scapegoat 
must always consider the power differentials involved. Scapegoating serves a purpose. In 
the case of Trump’s administration, scapegoating conceals the victimage of marginalized 
groups while affirming, and normalizing, the systems and institutions that contribute to 
their victimhood. The scapegoat silences by removing the means through which the 
marginalized “speak out” and are heard. Instead, it substitutes their experience with a 
reversed narrative of victimization that displaces marginalized groups by positioning 
dominant groups in their place, preventing the status quo of power from being disrupted, 
changed, or altered. The scapegoat channels the guilt and complicity dominant groups 
play in the US’s history of systemic injustice and iniquity into something that can be 
ostracized or sacrificed.  
Scapegoating inflicts suffering on its victims and alters the course of America’s 
future to be one that is hostile to difference, in which the marginalized must continue to 
inhabit silence, and of which the dominant still, and will continue to, benefit. 
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Scapegoating is a form of symbol-making imbued with power, and it makes the lives of 
its victims appreciably worse. Here is an excerpt pulled from an article describing how 
while pursuing his PHD in economics at Harvard, Stephens-Davidowitz: 
“became obsessed with Google Trends, a tool that tracks how frequently 
searches are made in a given area over a given time period.  
He spent five years combing through this data. The idea was that you 
could get far better real-time information about what people are thinking by 
looking at Google Trends data than you could through polls or some other survey 
device. 
 […] 
As a barometer of our national consciousness, Google is as accurate (and 
predictive) as it gets. In 2016, when the Republican primaries were just 
beginning, most pundits and pollsters did not believe Trump could win. After all, 
he had insulted veterans, women, minorities, and countless other constituencies. 
But Stephens-Davidowitz saw clues in his Google research that suggested 
Trump was far more serious than many supposed. Searches containing racist 
epithets and jokes were spiking across the country during Trump’s primary run, 
and not merely in the South but in upstate New York, Western Pennsylvania, 
Eastern Ohio, rural Illinois, West Virginia, and industrial Michigan. 
Stephens-Davidowitz saw in the Google Trends data a racially polarized 
electorate, and one primed to respond to the ethno-nationalist rhetoric of Trump. 
There were earlier signs, too. On Obama’s 2008 election night, Stephens-
Davidowitz found that “one in every hundred Google searches that included the 
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word ‘Obama’ also included ‘KKK’” or the n-word. Searches for racist websites 
like Stormfront also spiked. 
‘There was a darkness and hatred that was hidden from traditional 
sources,’ Stephens-Davidowitz says. ‘Those searches are hard to reconcile with a 
society in which racism is a small factor.’ (Illing) 
What Stephens-Davidowitz’s data suggests is that the conditions for scapegoating 
were already in place, and that Trump only capitalized on already existent negative 
sentiment, mobilizing it to ascend to power on the backs of the powerless. Rhetorically, 
the scapegoat serves to justify and legitimize the victimization of others. 
To say the least, this trend is unsettling. Despite the scapegoat’s concealment of 
the prejudiced nature of its mechanism, the impact of it and rhetoric like it is immediate, 
observable, and even obvious, if only one knows what to look for. A quote from Senator 
Marco Rubio made “before suspending his own presidential campaign” is “a final plea 
for the public to reject Trump. ‘This is what happens when a leading presidential 
candidate goes around feeding into a narrative of anger and bitterness and frustration,” he 
said. “If this continues, I think this country will continue to be ripped apart at the seams... 
you can’t say whatever you want. It has real-life consequences for people in this country 
and for people all over the world’” (Beutler). 
We must not allow for the marginalized, whether citizens of America or 
otherwise, to be made into scapegoat, nor for the conditions and precedents to ever 
culminate into the sad song that leads to excision, ostracization, and sacrifice. Rather, we 
should look to the dominate forces and ask what ‘dirt’ they must cleanse so urgently, and 
consider the twisted, eerie reflection of power the scapegoat reflects. If America is ever to 
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match the constitutional ideal of equality and liberty, then the scapegoat can’t be allowed 
to mask the barriers impeding, even damaging, the possibility of this ideal ever coming to 
fruition. 
Scapegoating is an eerie mirror. Dissecting it reveals what scapegoating attempts 
to redirect or conceal. In conjunction with Glenn’s work with the rhetoric of silence, 
Burke’s notion of scapegoating may be used to methodically analyzed for the rhetorical 
strategies of both silence and the spoken that lend it influence and power. Considering its 
recent use by Trump is important, but we must go further, as the use of the scapegoat in 
modern US politics will only continue and intensify as time goes on. Thus, we should 
attend to scapegoating by developing a vocabulary capable of encompassing its varied 
usage and effects, a task I’ve only just begun in my analysis of the power dynamics of 
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